From: Tc McCluan, email@example.com
I was on http://www.starshine.org/linux/ and since I am unable to compile Tripwire 1.2 on my system (redhat 4.2 with 2.0.33 kernel) I am trying all avenues of help.
I have tried the recommendation in the /contrib/README.linux but I still get the same error message. I have tried many combinations, but still no luck.
Following are the list of errors I am getting, hopefully you can spot where this compile is failing. Thanks in advance,
You could look for my Tripwire patch at
... or you could grab the RPM file from any Red Hat "contrib" mirror like:
... for a precompiled binary or:
... for sources that you should be able to build cleanly.
So far I really haven't found a tripwire configuration that I really like. I can never quite get the balance between what aspects to ignore (permission and ownership changes on /dev/tty*, /dev/pty*, etc) and which ones I need to watch.
So, if anyone out there as a really good tw.config file that really minimizes the superfluous alerts and maximized the intrustion detection, I'd like to hear about it.
Also if anyone has a YARD or other rescue disk builder that is customized for creating write-protected tripwire boot/root diskette sets (for periodic integrity auditing of Linux systems) I'd like to see a step-by-step Mini-HOWTO or tutorial (maybe as a submission to Linux Gazette).
From: Paul T. Karsh ITTC-237B 8-286-xxxx, firstname.lastname@example.org
I happened on the Linux Gazette in the process of searching for some information on "scripting" macros in the Applixware spreadsheet. Although this is not strictly a Linux question, I hope you can help me with some "pointers" (links ?) on how to learn this language. The Applixware help is no help and the company at which I consult does not have the on-line Applixware books nor the hardcopy "macro" manual.
I played with Applixware a little bit -- but was highly discouraged to find that its file conversion package couldn't handle more recent versions of MS Word and Excel. That was my main interest in the product since I occasionally get file attachments in these proprietary formats -- and sometimes they are potential customers.
As for the issue of learning this Macro language without having the appropriate documentation. I would ask your client where their manuals and/or installation CD is -- if they can't produce it and are unwilling to order a replacement then I would question their decision to use the product.
Applixware is a commercial product. Assuming this is on a Linux system you'd probably want to contact Red Hat Corporation to order replacement manuals (I think RH is the sole Linux distributor for Applixware -- just as Caldera is the sole distributor for the Linux version of WordPerfect).
If they have the installation CD -- borrow it and install its online documentation on some system somewhere (long enough to get the information your need). Be sure to remove that installation unless the appropriate licensing arrangements are made, of course.
Is there somewhere on the net (FTP or anything) where I can get an intro to this? I tried the Applixware site; it just seems to be page after page of PR.
I would like to see far more technical content on their web site as well. (The same desire applies to other hardware and software company sites).
From: Anthony E. Geene, email@example.com
I'm not a procmail user, but I've found that most spam is sent using envelope addresses, the standard recipient headers are not addressed to the actual recipient. So I set up filters to catch my mailing list mail and any mail that is addressed to a list of my vailid addresses. Other mail is put elsewhere for later review.
Such a method is relatively simple and would catch all but the more sophisticated spammers.
It is a good suggestion. It doesn't work if you have some people that prefer to Bcc: you (use "blind carbon copies"). Naturally many people's mail user agents (MUA's) like elm, pine, etc don't have obvious options for Bcc:'s -- others do (and most Unix/Linux MUA's allow some way to do it -- even if it isn't *obvious*).
There are probably a number of other "false positive" situations. As you say most automated mailing lists have headers that would trigger on your criteria. The obvious response to these problems is to make a list of all the exceptional cases (of which you are aware) and add appropriate rules to precede your anti-spam filter.
In addition it is important to ensure that your disposition of apparently bogus messages is a refile to a specific mail folder. You don't want to file it to /dev/null!
As you check your "probably junk" folder you can manually refile the exceptions -- and optionally add new rules to "pre-approve" lists of your favorite correspondents.
Note: if you keep a list of correspondents and a list of known spammers, and you write a recipe to check the list you may be concerned about the amount of time spent in 'grep'. Here's a hint: keep the list sorted and use the 'look' command.
(The advantage of 'look' is that it does a "binary" search (think about successive approximation to "zero in on" the desired lines) on a sorted file -- and returns the lines that match. While the overhead of 'grep' grows in a linear fashion (the search doubles in time as the file doubles in size) that of 'look' grows much more slowly (it's proportional to the square root of number of records/lines in the file). Similar results would be attained if one used 'dbm' hashes (indexes) -- but there is greater overhead in programming (Perl offers modules to support dbm, gdbm, ndbm and other hashing libraries -- it also has much higher load time overhead as a result of it's generality).
The point is that even on a small file (100 lines) I can see about a 10% difference in overhead. After a few thousand lines the difference is substantial (grep takes twice as long to run).
None of this matters much on your personal workstation which has only one active user and receives a couple hundred e-mail items per day. However -- if you're filtering on the company mailhub, or at your ISP's location -- it's worth it to reduce your impact.
From: Anthony E. Geene, firstname.lastname@example.org
I read your procmail article in issue 14 of the Linux Gazette. It was the best explanation of how procmail works that I've seen yet.
I just wanted to say Thanks,
Thanks for the feedback. BTW there is a new article on use TDG (The Dotfile Generator) as a GUI front end for creating procmail scripts. I haven't finished reading it yet -- but it looks pretty good to me.
In your earlier mail you mentioned that you aren't using procmail yet. This article on TDG and my explanation of what's going on "under the hood" may yet change that. (Also, somewhere on that morass of half-baked pages that I keep as a "website" are some links to other procmail and mail filtering resources).
From: Antonio Sindona, Antonio.Sindona@trinacria.it
I'd like to create a *Linux cluster configuration* to have some degree of fault-tolerance (Linux normally works ... hardware not always ! ;-) ). Do You know if somebody tried to develop something to solve this problem ?
The first place I'd look for info on fault tolerance for
Linux would be:
Linux High Availability HOWTO
Then take a look at:
Linux Parallel Processing HOWTO
MP and Clustering for Linux
One of the most famous Linux parallel computing projects (which has been written up in the _Linux_Journal_ among other places) is the Beowulf Project:
After you've been overwhelmed by reading all of that you can slog through all of the links at:
Linux Parallel Processing Using Clusters
.... which include links to some classic Unix projects like "Condor," PVM, and MPI.
After reading all of those you'll undoubtedly decide that Linux is years ahead of Microsoft in the field of clustering. (MS' "wolfpack" project is still vaporware last I heard). However, lest we grow complacent we should consider some features that Linux needs to compete with mainframe and mini clustering technologies (like those in VMS, and the ones that HP managed to eke out of their aquisition of Apollo -- when they gutted DomainOS, from what I hear).
The two features Linux needs in order to attain the next level of clustering capacity are "transparent checkpointing" and "process migration."
"Transparent checkpointing" allows the kernel to periodically take a comprehensive snapshot of a process' state (to disk or to some network filesystem) and allows the OS to restart a process "where it left off" in the event of a system failure.
(System failures that damage the checkpoint files notwithstanding, of course).
"Process Migration" allows a node's kernel to push a process onto another (presumably less heavily loaded) system. The process continues to run on the new system without any knowlege of the transition.
At first it seems like "checkpointing" would cost way too much in performance. However, it turns out that relatively little of your system's RAM has been modified from the disk images (binaries and libraries) in any given time frame. I've heard reliable reports that this has almost trivial overhead on a Unix/Linux like system.
It's easy to see how "checkpointing" is a necessary feature to support process migration. However, it's not enough. You also need mechanisms to allow the target kernel to give the incoming process access to all of the resources that it had allocated (open file descriptors, other interprocess channels, etc). For Unix like systems you also have to account for the process structure (the PID of the process can't change) -- and there has to be some implicit inter-node communications to maintain the process groups (to get a process' exit status to its parent and to allow members of a process group to get status and send signals to it.
There have been a number of operating systems that have implemented checkpointing and process migration features. Chorus Mi/X, Berkeley Sprite and Amoeba (a project that the father of Minix, Andrew S. Tanenbaum, collaborated on) come to mind.
(see http://www.am.cs.vu.nl/ for info on Amoeba, http://HTTP.CS.Berkeley.EDU/projects/sprite/ for Sprite, and http://www.chorus.com for Chorus Mi/X info).One Unix package that is supposed to offer these features is Softway Ltd's Hibernator II. Just SGI and a Fujitsu mainframe version are supported. This is probably an expensive commercial package and we shouldn't hold our breath for a Linux port.
The MOSIX project also supports transparent process migration (imagine that copy of emacs being moved from one overloaded CPU to an idle machine while you were using it). It is currently available on BSD/OS. However we're in luck! As I was typing this and checking my URL's and references I noticed the following statement on their pages:
``MOSIX for Linux (RedHat) is now under development''
You can read more about MOSIX (and see this note yourself) at:
(Hebrew University, Israel)
One OS project that I've been keeping my eye on for awhile has been EROS (http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~eros/). This isn't widely available yet -- but I have high hopes for it. It will use a "persistence" model that implicitly checkpoints the state of the entire system (all processes and threads).
EROS is not "Unix" though it should eventually support a Unix/Linux compatible subsystem (called Dionysix). The major difference is that EROS is a pure "capabilities" system. ``Capabilities'' are the key to a security model that is much different than the traditional identity/group (Unix), process privileges (VMS and Posix.6), and ACL (NT, Netware, etc) that are common in other operating systems. Read Mr. Shapiro's web pages for more info on that.
I personally think we (in the Linux community) have quite a bit to learn from other operating systems -- their strengths and their weaknesses. To anyone of us who would say "But those are just obscure systems. Nobody is running those!" I would point out that millions of PC users still have that same reaction to Linux.
So, to learn *far* more than you ever wanted to know about operating systems *other* than DOS, MacOS, and Unix take a look at the links on my short page about OS':
From: Jack Holloway
Ok... I'm alittle foggy on the terminology... if I have a machine on an ethernet network that is hooked to the internet, and I want all of the other machines on the network to connect to the internet THROUGH the machine connected to the internet, I need to use IP masquerading or proxy server stuff?
You can use IP Masquerading and/or any sort of proxy systems.
IP Masquerading is a particular form of NAT (network address translation).
The one machine (your Linux box) that is connected to your LAN and to the Internet is the "router" or "gateway." ("routers" work at the "transport" layer, while "gateways" work at the "applications" layer of the OSI reference model). (More on that later).
One "real" (IANA issued) IP address is assigned to the "outer" interface and attached to the Internet (through your ISP). This will typically be a PPP link through your router/gateway's modem -- though it might be any network interface that you can get Linux to use.
One the other interface (typically an ethernet card) you assign one out of any of the "private" or "reserved for disconnected networks" IP address ranges as defined in RFC1918 (previously in RFC1597 and 16??). These RFC1918 addresses are guaranteed to never be issued to any Internet host (so those of use using them on our networks will never create an ambiguity with *our* router by attempting to access a machine *outside* our network that has an IP address that duplicates one *inside* of our network).
The RFC1918 address blocks are:
10.*.*.* (one class A net) 172.16.*.* through 172.31.*.* (16 class B's) 192.168.0.* through 192.168.255.* (255 class C's)You can pick any of those RFC1918 address blocks and you can subnet them anyway that's convenient. I use 192.168.64.0 for my home LAN.
Within my LAN I use the .1 address (192.168.64.1) for my Linux gateway/router's ethernet -- it gets its other (real) IP address dynamically from my ISP when 'diald' establishes a connection (diald is a daemon that automatically invokes my ppp connection whenever traffic routing to the network is required -- I actually have another RFC1918 address assigned to the SLIP connection that diald uses for internal purposes). I run a caching nameserver on this box (which we'll call "gw").
All systems on my LAN execute a line like the following:
route add -net 192.168.64.0 eth0... in their rc scripts at some point. This configures them to all agree where packets for this network go. This is called a "static" route.
I then point the /etc/resolv.conf on all of the "client" machines on my LAN to "gw" and add a default route to each of them that looks like:
route add default gw 192.168.64.1 # other traffic goes to host named "gw"(the "client" machines don't have to be Linux and don't have to have any special support for IP Masquerading -- you just assign them IP addresses like 192.168.64.2, etc. to each of them).
In the "gw" server I have the kernel compiled with masquerading and "forwarding" support enabled (of course). I don't put in the default static route -- that would be a loop. "gw" also has a different /etc/resolv.conf file -- one that points to a couple of my ISP nameservers.
Note: One trick I've learned about resolv.conf files -- You only get three nameserver entries (in most versions of the bind libraries) -- so I repeat the first and the last one. When a query times out (for a client) it moves to the second nameserver. Meanwhile the first nameserver still has a good chance of getting a response (DNS over today's busy Internet times out more often than nameservers fail). So, a timeout on the second nameserver leads to a repeat request on the first one -- which has probably received and cached a response by this time. I could explain that in more detail -- but the real gist is: try it. It helps.
Now, back to masquerading:
All it takes for masquerading to work is to run the command
LAN="192.168.64.0/24" ipfwadm -F -a accept -m -S $LAN -D 0.0.0.0/0... which means:
use the "IP firewall administrative" program to make the following change to the "forwarding" (-F) table:
add/append (-a) a rule to accept for masquerading (-m) any packet from (-S or "source address") my LAN (which is a shell variable I defined in the preceding line) that is going to (whose "destination" -D) is anywhere (0.0.0.0/0).Here's how that works. When the kernel receives a packet that's not destined for the localhost (the gateway itself) it checks to see if forwarding is enabled, then it looks in the routing table to see where the packet should go. My gateway's default route is pointing to the sl0 interface (the SLIP interface that diald maintains to detect outgoing traffic) -- when diald detects traffic on sl0 -- it runs my PPP connection script which changes the default route to point to my ISP's routers (which is part of the information that's negotiated via PPP along with my dynamic IP address). Now the packet is "forwarded" from interface to the other. Assuming that the packet came from my LAN (via the ethernet card in "gw" the kernel's packet filtering ("firewall") code takes over.
ipfw inspects the packet to see if it was part of an existing TCP session (part of a connection that it has already been working with). If it is than ipfw notes the TCP "port" that this session is assigned to, otherwise ipfw just picks another port. If it picks a new port it adds an entry to it's masquerading table that records the packet's original source address and source port. The "client" machine on my LAN is expecting any reply packets to come back to the appropriate source port (which is how it knows which process' "socket" to write the reply packets to) -- ipfw then re-writes the packet headers, changing the source address to match the one on ppp0 (the "real IP address for which my ISP knows a route), and changing the source port to the one it selected.
When ipfw receives reply packets the kernel routes them to sockets which ipfw owns (the source port on my outgoing packets becomes the destination port on the reply packets). ipfw then looks that socket up in its table, retrieves the *original* source addr and port (for the outgoing packet that generated this reply) rewrites the destination fields (on the *reply* packet). Finally the (now re-written) packet is routed to the LAN.
Effectively IP Masquerading makes a whole LAN full of machines look like one really busy one to the rest of the Internet. While a typical workstation might only have a few dozen active network connections available, a masquerading gateway might have hundreds or thousands. As a practical matter the TCP/IP protocol provides a 16 bit field for "ports" and Most Unix systems can't handle more than a few thousand concurrent open connections (sockets) and file descriptors. (This has to do with the tables that the kernel allocates for the data structures that manage all this -- regardless of whether masquerading is active or not). Luckily you're unlikely to have enough bandwidth to approach Linux' capacity.
I'm sorry for the length of that description. Note that it is purely conceptual (I've never read the code, I've just deduced what it must be doing from what I know of how TCP works).
Ouch! That's a big question there! Ok, firstly, do own IPs for every machine on your network? (That is, do you have an internet unique IP for each machine) If so, all you want is routed. If you don't, then to
'routed' is deprecated. In addition he doesn't need routed or gated to talk to his ISP (and almost certainly can't use it with them -- they won't listen to his routes unless he goes out and gets an AS number and negotiates a contract for "peering" with them which would absurd unless he were becoming a multi-home ISP or something like that).
The case where routed or gated makes sense is with his own internetwork of LAN's. If he has several ethernet segments and is moving systems around them frequently (or adding new IP devices to them) then it would be be useful. For simpler and for more structured LANs (each ether segment gets a subnet -- a global, static routing table is distributed to all routers) you don't need or want 'routed' or 'gated'.
If he had a block of ISP (or IANA) issued IP addresses, his ISP would have to include routing to them (they don't make sense otherwise). Usually this amounts to some static routes that they maintain in their systems -- specifically some entries that are invoked whenever your system authenticates on one of their terminal servers or routers.
You don't have to run any software on your end to make use of this routing. (That's a confusing statement -- you have to run PPP or SLIP to connect to them -- but once you're connected they will route packets to you even if your routes back to them are completely missing).
As I've described above -- you just have to have your own LAN routing set up properly. That means that each system on your LAN has "-net" routes unto your ethernet and a "default gw" route to your router/gateway (masquerading host).
browse the web you can use a proxy server(which looks to the outside world as if only the proxy is actually on the net.). If you want to telnet etc. out, you will need IP-Masquerading, which isn't the most reliable way of doing things. ask me further in email if you need more detail!
I disagree with several points here. Both masquerading *and* proxying look like "only the proxy is actually on the net." -- because only the router/gateway has an IP address with valid Internet routes. The rest of your LAN is "hidden" (behind your "gw") because those IP addresses don't have valid Internet routes. The are IP addresses but they are not *Internet* addresses!
Proxying is an applications layer solution. Masquerading and NAT are transport layer. The difference is what data structures the software is dealing with.
At the network layer we're working with "data frames." This is what an ethernet bridge or switch uses -- the MAC (BIA) addresses. That's also the layer at which ARP (address resolution protocol) works. It's how one host finds finds the ethernet card address of another system that's on the same LAN (how our client machines "find" our router/gw).
At the transport layer we deal with packets. These have IP addresses (as opposed to the MAC -- media access control -- addresses in the ethernet "frame" header). This is where the masquerading happens. As I've described masquerading involves a relatively "dumb" (mechanical) bit of packet patching with some table reference and maintenance. Technically there are some details I left out -- like recomputing the packet checksums.
The problem is that the transport layer conveys no information about the applications protocol for which it is a carrier. For "normal" TCP protocols (like HTTP and telnet) this is no problem. However, FTP and a few other protocols do "bad" things. In particular an FTP session consists of *two* TCP sessions (a control session which is initiated from the client to the server) and a data session which is initiated from the server back to the client! The IP address and port to which this "return connection" goes is passed to the server via the control connection. This last detail has caused more firewall designers and admins to rip out their hair than all the cheap combs from China. In the context of masquerading it means that the masquerading server must monitor the *data* (the stuff in the payloads of the packets) and make some selective patches therein. In the other cases we only touched the headers of each packet -- never the contents of their payloads.
So, this is the part of Masquerading that is unreliable. Linux IP Masquerading is by no means the only flavor -- though it's probably the most widely used by now. Linux as several modules for dealing with unruly protocols -- so the usually work.
However, I've found it more reliable to use the TIS FWTK ftp-gw (Trusted Information Systems http://www.tis.com, Firewall Toolkit). This is a proxy.
Proxy packages work at the applications layer. You have to have support for each applications protocol (http, ftp, telnet, rlogin, smtp, etc) that you want to allow "through" your firewall. They come in two forms: SOCKS and FWTK (There are many of them besides these -- but all of them follow one *model* or the other).
In the FWTK model the user opens his or her initial connection to the firewall (I 'ftp' to gw.starshine.org). The firewall (gateway) is running the FWTK proxy *instead of* (or *in addition to*) the normal server (ftpd). If it is "in addition to" than one or the other must be on a different port or using a different IP Alias on the machine (more on that later). Now my FTP server (ftp-gw) prompts me to "login"
For a normal FTP server I'd type my name (or "ftp" or "anonymous"). For ftp-gw I'm trying to go *though* this machine and unto one that's on the other side (on the Internet). So I have to provide more information. So I type:
... or whatever. The gateway ftp server then opens a connection to my target (everthing *after* the @ sign) and passes my name (everything before the @ sign) to *its* login prompt.
The TIS FWTK comes with a number of other small proxies -- and most of them work in a similar fasion. (There are also options to limit *who* can access *what* and *when* (via administrator edited access control lists).
The key point here is that FWTK doesn't require any special client software support. The users have to be trained how to traverse the firewall and the have to remember how to do it.
FWTK is only appropriate for relative small groups of technically savvy users (who are easy to train in this and won't make the sysadmin's life a constant hell of walking everyone through this extra connectivity step).
SOCKS has a model that works for larger groups of less savvy users. However, it requires that you install SOCKS aware versions of your client applications. So you have to replace your normal telnet, ftp, rlogin, etc with a "socksified" version. In many cases it is possible to effectively "socksify" all of your client utilities by replacing a shared library (Unix/Linux) or a DLL (Windows). Many commercial TCP clients and utilities are built with SOCKS support (Netscape Navigator and Communicator are prime examples). I think the Trumpet shareware utilities for Windows are another.
The hassle is installing and configuring this software on every client system. However, the advantage is that none of the users has to remember, or even know, about the firewall. The SOCKS applications will automatically negotiate sessions through the firewall.
There are some protocols that are inherently easy or even unnecessary to proxy. For example DNS doesn't need to be proxied. You run your caching copy of named and let all of the client machines talk to and trust it. This gives a great performance boost to most of the clients and saves quite a bit of bandwidth on the critical link to the ISP. There is no reason that I can think of not to run a caching nameserver somewhere on your Internet connected LAN.
HTTP is a protocol that benefits quite a bit from proxying. It is trivial to add caching features a web proxy -- and I think just about all of them do so.
SMTP is a protocol that doesn't need proxying (from the standpoint of the clients on your LAN). You configure an internally accessible system to accept mail and it will relay it to your gateway via whatever means you configure. A typical model would be that outgoing mail is collected on an internal hub, which is configured to relay it to the external gateway, which, in turn, relays it to the ISP and on to the world. To see what this looks like read the "Received" headers in some of your mail.
The externally visible mail gateway can route mail back to the internal hub -- which can run POP and/or IMAP servers for the clients to use to actually get their mail. (You could have the internal hub route all of the mail directly to people's desktops via SMTP too.
The reason you generally don't need proxying for SMTP is that most sites use some form of masquerading (mail appears to come from the "domain" rather than from a particular host whithin the domain). FWTK includes smapd -- and there is an independent and free smtpd which act as proxies for sendmail. Here the intend is to have a small simple program receive mail and pass it along to the larger, vastly more complicated 'sendmail' itself. (I don't want to get into the raging debates about sendmail vs. qmail etc -- suffice it to say there are many alternatives).
Note that masquerading and proxying are not mutually exclusive. I use masquerading and I have ftp-gw and squid (caching web service) installed. I could also install SOCKS on the same gateway.
Incidentally I mentioned that it's possible to run ftpd and ftp-gw on the same machine without putting them on different ports. Here's two ways of doing that:
IP Aliasing method:
ifconfig eth0:1 192.168.64.129
email@example.com: 192.168.64. : twist /usr/local/fwtk/ftp-gwThis will "twist" any ftp request *to that IP alias* into an ftp-gw session. FTP requests to any other interface address will be handled in the usual way (tcpd will launch the ftp daemon that's listed in inetd.conf).
Loopback Twist method:
in.ftpd: 127.0.0.1 : ALLOW in.ftpd : ALL : twist /usr/local/fwtk/ftp-gwWARNING! This second line would allow *anyone* (from inside or outside) of your LAN to access the proxy. However, ftp-gw reads a file -- /usr/local/etc/netperm-table according to the way I compiled mine -- to determine who is allowed to access each of its proxy services.
So, this line is neither as dangerous as it looks nor as safe as it should be. Changing it to:
in.ftpd : LOCAL : twist /usr/local/fwtk/ftp-gw... is safer and more appropriate.
One key point here is that you can use proxies on your masquerading route/gateway to allow access from the "outside" back *into* services inside your LAN. Usually you want to prevent this (the whole point of a firewall). However you can use tcpd and netperm to allow specific 'friendly' networks to get to servers on one of your LAN's, despite the fact that there are no routes directly to those machines.
This brings us back to other forms of NAT. I mentioned at the get-go that masquerading is one form of NAT. It specifically involves a "many to one" arrangement. (The "many" clients on your LAN appearing as "one" connection to the Internet).
Another form of NAT is "many to many" -- where you have a table translations. Thus each of your systems might be configured to use one address, and be translated to appear as if it came from anoter. I personally don't see much use for this arrangement. The one case I could see for it might be if you had a net of devices that you couldn't renumber, which had "illegal" or "invalid" addresses.
One other form of NAT involves a different "many to many" translation -- its not currently available for Linux but it's used in the Cisco Local Director product. This is a trick for doing IP level load balancing. You have a "reverse masquerade" host accept requests to "a" busy server (one service on one IP address) and you have it masquerade the session to any of multiple "inside" machines that have the same service and content available.
For load balancing it's trivially easy to use DNS "round robin records" -- so I don't see much application for this form of NAT either.
Anyway -- that's all I have the energy to type for now.
I hope this explains the terms and concepts and gives you enough examples to set up what you want. For the most part you can just use the one magic ipfwadm command to "turn on" masquerading. The rest is just the configuration of your network and of your ISP connection -- which you've presumably already done.
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