Taking the Pain Out of Authentication
When dealing with authentication, there are a myriad of systems out there that validate user identity and permissions: shadow passwords, Kerberos, NIS and LDAP, just to name a few.
In early Unix and (very early) Linux deployments, the applications would be responsible for directly interacting with whatever security system that was in place for a given server. When it was just the app scanning the /etc/passwd file, that wasn't so hard to manage, but once all those other authentication systems were deployed, then leaving authentication in the application space quickly became unmanageable.
In 1995, Sun Microsystems came up with a better way: a library that would handle all of the communication between applications and whatever authentication system that might be in place. This would take the onus of authentication off application developers' plates, and prove to be much easier to expand. If a new authentication system is put into place, a shared library object can be added to the library, without any changes to the app. This library is known as the pluggable authentication module (PAM), and it's a big part of authentication systems used today.
The biggest advantage to PAM is scalability: the capability to add a new authentication system to any given server without needing to re-configure (or worse, re-compile) a program is a big deal. That's not to say there isn't some sort of payment to be made -- nothing is free. Instead of touching the application, all PAM-aware applications have a text configuration file that must be edited to compensate for any new module within the PAM library.
At first, that may seem like more trouble than it's worth, since managing multiple configuration files could quickly get painful. In truth, individual PAM configuration files enable each application to use any authentication protocol they need, even if they're on the same system. So, one application can use LDAP, while another can rely on shadow passwords, if that's what you need. Better still, with one notable exception, switching to a new protocol is as simple as plugging in the protocol's module to PAM then editing the application(s) configuration files to make note of the change. The application only cares what PAM is telling it, not what the actual authentication solution says.
Another important feature of PAM, which makes it of interest to authentication providers like Likewise, is that it can be used for more than just password management. PAMs can be configured to outline session setup, logging, permissions management, as well as work directly with Active Directory for authentication.
Modules can be combined as well, thus giving apps a layered approach to authentication, if needed. Individual PAM configuration files are comprised of a list, known as a "stack," of all the PAM modules that will govern access for the application in question. Modules are invoked in their stack order and any module failure will usually block access for the app. More lenient policies can be put in place that might circumvent this all-or-nothing approach.
One example of such a policy might be to allow a user to physically access a system at any time of the day, but not grant access remotely during certain times. (Care must be taken, though, to allow for international travelers who may indeed need to login remotely in the middle of the server's night.) Another such module could authenticate a user only if their Bluetooth-enabled device was broadcasting nearby.
Of course, like any system, PAM isn't without its vulnerabilities. A security hole this past summer would allow a malicious user to own the permissions of a vulnerable system's shadow password file. With access to the shadow file, the cracker could easily reset the password for every account on the machine, including root. At that point, the cracker can do just about anything to the box, including resetting the shadow file back to its former state, so that system administrators would be less likely to notice something was amiss. This vulnerability was very quickly patched, but it outlines the need to keep a constant eye on any authentication- or security-based frameworks.
The extreme scalability and flexibility of the PAM framework means it can fit within almost any security policy an organization might come up with. If a module or combination of modules doesn't meet specific security needs, then a new module can be written as a solution. Linux users, for instance, can visit Andrew Morgan's The Linux-PAM Module Writers' Guide to learn more about creating such solutions.
PAM is a major tool in the security world, and one well worth understanding, since it can do far more than just handle passwords.
Yvo Van Doorn is a self-proclaimed "interoperability geek." currently employed at Likewise, Yvo has a background managing large Linux, UNIX, Mac and Windows infrastructures at large technology companies. Ask him how many unique VM OSs he has running on his personal machine. The number might shock you.